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Thoughts on Preferences and utility
In The Salmon Case Study
Ray Hilborn
Pacific salmon are an extremely valuable resource on the
Pacific Rim of Canada. On the Skeena River, one of six major
salmon watersheds in B.C., the dollar value of the commercial
catch is between ten and twenty million dollars annually. In
addition, the salmon stocks provide recreational benefits for
many residents of British Columbia and contribute strongly
to the local recreational economy. Millions of dollars are
spent annually on managing the commercial and recreational
salmon fisheries; there is a current proposal by the federal
government to spend several hundred million dollars enhancing
the salmon stocks over the next few years. The current salmon
case study has been ｩ ｮ ｶ ｯ ｬ ｶ ｾ ､ in extensive modelling efforts to
determine policy options for salmon management and assess
these options. H6wever, we have recently realized that despite
our model's optimization techniques and the incredible elegance
of our approach, we really 'don't know what the people of
Canada want from the salmon fishery. An example: A recent
paper by Walters (1975a) showed that there were alternate
methods of ｭ ｡ ｮ ｡ ｧ ･ ｲ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｮ ｴ which could substantially reduce the
annual variation in harvest with only a small decline in
the average catch. Since the fishery currently tends to take
a boom or bust pattern, we thought this was an option which
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should seriously be considered. However, when we presented
this to government biologists familiar with the Skeena River
fishermen, they agreed among themselves that the fishermen
would probably prefer a high variation in catch to this
leveling option. Their reasoning was that the fishermen
seem to operate with the secret hope of striking it rich with
a few good years. With this hope of a "big" year, they are
willing to accept incredibly low incomes ($2000-3000 per year).
We recognize now, as Ralph Keeney pointed out, that
sophisticated modelling cannot be beneficial unless you have
a way of assessing the utility of your proposed management
options for the people affected by the management. It seems
very likely that we will receive funds from the Canadian
government to undertake a fairly large scale project to
assess the preferences of the people affected by the salmon
fishery. We plan to begin this work next year when we return
to Vancouver. In order to get some experience with the
technique and to clarify our understanding of the interaction
between preferences, utility and policy assessment, we have
begun a small scale project in which we pretend that we are
the people affected by the fishery, and attempt to determine
our preferences and utilities. This is being done by Ralph
Keeney and David Bell, members of the methodology project,
who are experienced at determining multi-attribute utility.
What we wish to do in the rest of this paper is describe how
we think the preference analysis will fit into the rest of
our study and propose some techniques for utilizing preference
analysis in hierarchical decision processes.
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Preferences in the salmon study
The major difference between our approach and the one
used by the ecology group's budworm study last year (Bell
1974), is that we explicitly recognize that there is a set of
defineable groups affected by the management policies used,
and that these groups tend to have vastly different preferences.
These interest groups consist of the commercial fishermen,
recreational fishermen, Indians, residents of the Skeena River
watershed who cater to the fishery, the fish consuming
public, and the owners and operators of the commercial canneries.
The federal government determines the management policies for
the fishery, naturally hoping to make everyone as happy as
possible at the least expense. The budworm study faced
similar conditions; but instead of explicitly defining the
interest groups, the budworm group determined the preferences
of some undefined person who seemed to schizophrenically jump
from the role of a lumber mill employee to the president of
the New Brunswick Audubon Society. In the preference analysis
we are undertaking, the goal will be to develop the prefer-
ences for each interest group separately. The question then
is how to combine all of these different objective functions
into a single function which represents how the manager
views the entire salmon fishery. Our impression, based on
complete ignorance of the literature, is that the traditional
method is to develop one or two key indicators for each of
the interest groups, and then have the manager construct his
objective function from these indicators. This is certainly
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what a manager would implicitly do if interrogated about his
preferences from a large choice of indicators. He would mentally
pick out the indicator that most closely represented each
interest group's preferences, and do some mental weighting
of each of these indicators. We think that this can produce
some problems, because this process assumes that each interest
group's preferences are very closely tied to a single indicator,
and does not allow for the possibility that there are complex
tradeoffs ｡ ｭ ｯ ｾ ｧ indicators within an interest group. There-
fore we will give our surrogate decision maker his indicators
as the utitlity of each interest group (a single number), and
he will be asked to construct his utility function from
the utilities derived from all interest groups. We will then
use the other method, giving the decision maker the raw in-
dicators, and compare the results of these two methods.
From the proposed preference analysis, we ｨ ｯ ｾ ･ to con-
struct a single objective function into which we can plug
the numbers corning out of our dynamic simulation models
to get a method for comparing different management policies.
An aspect of our surrogate decision makers' utility function
we wish to examine is their willingness to increase our in-
terest group's utility at the expense of another interest
group. We suspect that politicians, the usual decision makers,
are very unwilling to make anyone unhappy and would forego
increasing the utility of several interest groups if it meant
decreasing the utility of another interest group. If this is
true, it could have serious consequences for management. It
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could mean that the decision makers generally reject a policy
which would eventually lead to a very desireable situation
(all interest groups' utilities increased), if it meant a tem-
porary decrease in the utility of a single group. This is
akin to the standard tragedy-of-the-commons aspect of most
fisheries. Everyone knows that all concerned parties would
be better off if fishing pressure were greatly reduced for
several years to allow a stock to recover, but the fishermen,
being very vocal, scream bloody murder and the over exploita-
tion continues. This may well be a result of discounting
rates more than of the decision makers' aversion to reducing
utility of any interest group, but we feel it should be
explored.
To summarize, we see three major benfits coming out of
our preference analysis in the salmon study.
1) From this analysis, we hope to gain a better under-
standing of what is and is not valued by the people affected
by salmon management. This in itself should be very useful
to decision makers.
2) We hope to obtain a realistic objective function to
use in evaluating proposed management options.
3) We hope to gain some insight into the dicision making
process and see if there are aspects of decision makers'
utility function which tend to cause resource management to
reject seemingly desirable options.
Utilities in hierarchical decision making processes
As we mentioned earlier, the decision making process for
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Skeena River salmon is a simple hierarchy - several interest
groups are affected by a single decision maker. However,
this is really a gross simplification. The decision making
process is very diffuse and different decisions are made at
a number of governmental levels. This, combined with the
spatial complexity of salmon management, produces a very
complicated decision making structure. At the federal level
major decisions are made, such as 'will we enhance salmon
stocks?' or 'will we eliminate the commercial net fisheries?',
etc. At the regional level decisions are made between major
salmon areas: given that Ottowa has decided to enhance
salmon stocks, should enhancement be done on the Skeena or
the Fraser? At the next lower level, decisions are made
separately for each major salmon area concerning annual catches,
length of the season etc. This entire process is roughly
outlined by Walters (1975b). It is difficult to define where
people's preferences and utilities come in within such a
complex decision making structure. We suspect the decision
makers are using their own version of 'horse sense' to decide
what to do and we propose another method. This is to set
up a hierarchy with the decision maker at each level construct-
ing a utility function based on the utilities of all of his
decision making subordinates. The lowest level would be the
interest groups of each major watershed. Thus the utilities
of the Skeena River fishermen, residents, and Indians would
be given to the Skeena River decision maker, who would con-
struct his utility function from the utilities of his interest
groups. Then the utilities of the Skeena River manager, the
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Fraser River manager, etc., would be the indicators for the
British Columbia salmon manager to use in constructing his
utility functions. Then at a federal level the ｳ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｮ man-
agers from throughout Canada, would pass their utilities up
for the final utility function.
There are several advantages of this method. It does not
require the decision maker in Ottowa to try to figure out what
the average fisherman in Prince Rupert (on the Skeena River)
wants from the ｳ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｮ fishery. He needs only to decide what
his preferences are between east coast and west coast fish-
eries. Of course this does assume that he is confident that
the utility functions of his subordinate decision makers are
similar to his own. A second advantage, and probably the
most important, is that if the interest groups are properly
selected, and the decision making structure is hierarchical
as described, then every decision maker can have a utility
function which is not interdependent with his input indicators.
These interdependencies arise when there is a common property
shared by two indicators. For instance, a fisherman's utility
for the total catch of sockeye ｳ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｮ depends upon the catch
of pink ｳ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｮ Ｎ If the sockeye catch is very high increasing
the pink catch by 50% would not increase the utility of the
fisherman nearly as much as a 50% increase in pink catch would
if the sockeye catch were low. These interpendencies should
occur only at the interest group level in the proposed
hierarchical system. Decision makers' utility functions should
not have any interdependencies among the input indicators.
-8-
This is an a priori hope and will be exained in the prefer-
ence analysis we will perform.
The above ramblings represent our idea of how we might
approach assessing preferences in a complex resource manage-
ment problem. We propose to stumble ahead blindly, hopefully
learning something in the process. We have attempted to
follow the research methods of the Urban group: talk about
what we are interested in, not what we have done. So, naturally,
we welcome any comments. (Anonymous comments will not be
considered) .
